

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL REGION

# GCC Weekly Intelligence

06 July 2026

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Actionable Intelligence – Regional Protection



# Executive Summary

## BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

Managed de-escalation is visible, but maritime risk has widened across Hormuz and the Red Sea.

- The GCC environment has moved from immediate escalation risk into managed tension with selective recovery. Qatar's maritime reopening, continued aviation activity and improving energy confidence are positive indicators, but the region has not returned to normal operating conditions.
- The main change since the last report is maritime. Hormuz remains politically contested, while the latest vessel attack off Yemen's Red Sea coast brings Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea-linked cargo back into focus. Operators now face a two-chokepoint risk picture rather than a Hormuz-only problem.
- Iran's leverage over Hormuz remains central to the geopolitical outlook. UK-France readiness to support a maritime security force may reassure shipping, but it could also sharpen Iranian objections and increase tactical friction around the strait. Kuwait and Bahrain remain the most exposed GCC states. Qatar is improving but still vulnerable through LNG and Hormuz-linked tanker confidence. Oman's diplomatic and maritime value is rising. The UAE and Saudi Arabia remain operationally resilient but exposed to aviation, maritime, energy and routing risk.

Saudi Arabia — Watch — **MODERATE**

Kuwait — Watch — **SEVERE**

UAE — Watch — **MODERATE**

Oman — Watch — **HIGH**

Bahrain — Watch — **HIGH**

Qatar — Watch — **HIGH**

### PLANNING ASSUMPTION

Plan for managed tension rather than full recovery. Qatar's maritime reopening, energy-market stabilisation and Opec+ output signals are positive, but posture should remain elevated until Hormuz transit is predictable, Red Sea attacks do not expand, Gulf aviation remains incident-free, and the US-Iran track holds without pressure from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen.

[ Assessed — moderate confidence ]

# Regional Risk Snapshot

COUNTRY	STRIKE	INFRA	OPS	TREND	ONE-LINE STATUS
Bahrain	SEVERE	MOD-HIGH	HIGH	▶ WATCH	Security coordination and Iranian-linked sensitivity keep Bahrain inside the elevated-risk envelope.
Kuwait	SEVERE	HIGH	HIGH	▶ WATCH	Northern Gulf, Iraq-border, missile and airspace exposure keep Kuwait at severe risk.
Qatar	MODERATE	MOD-HIGH	MODERATE	▲ IMPROVING / WATCH	Maritime activity has resumed, but LNG, Hormuz and tanker-confidence exposure remain active.
UAE / Dubai	MOD-HIGH	MODERATE	MOD-HIGH	▶ WATCH	Open but actively managed aviation and maritime environment; GNS and Hormuz exposure remain active.
Saudi Arabia	MODERATE	MODERATE	MODERATE	▶ WATCH	Energy confidence is improving, but Red Sea/Houthi and Gulf spillover keep posture elevated.
Oman	LOW-MOD	MODERATE	MOD-HIGH	▶ WATCH	Diplomatic value is rising as Hormuz transit and freedom-of-navigation issues remain central.

RISK SCALE ■ LOW ■ MODERATE ■ HIGH ■ SEVERE ■ CRITICAL



**GCC**  
Gulf Cooperation Council

# Saudi Arabia

## SECURITY SITUATION

Saudi Arabia remains comparatively steady, but the risk picture has shifted from immediate Gulf spillover toward broader regional management. Riyadh is balancing energy-market recovery, Red Sea maritime exposure and diplomatic engagement on Syria. Saudi support for Syria's security and stability reinforces its wider role in regional stabilisation, but events in Syria, Yemen and the Red Sea remain relevant external pressure points. Priority monitoring areas include energy infrastructure, ports, diplomatic sites, government facilities, Red Sea-linked logistics and high-footfall commercial areas. The most relevant external risks remain Houthi activity, Bab el-Mandeb pressure, Hormuz disruption and wider energy-market volatility.

## AVIATION

Saudi airspace remains open and usable for international and domestic operations. Jeddah and Riyadh FIR routes continue to support regional aviation resilience as operators review higher-risk airspace linked to Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and the northern Gulf.

The main aviation exposure is indirect: rerouting pressure, fuel-cost changes, short-notice NOTAM activity and diversion planning if Gulf or Red Sea airspace sensitivity increases. Operators should apply elevated review for Eastern Province, Riyadh, Jeddah, Red Sea and Gulf-facing routes.

## MARITIME

Saudi maritime operations remain functional, but Red Sea risk has become more relevant after the latest vessel attack off Yemen's coast. Ras Tanura, Jubail, Jeddah Islamic Port and Red Sea approaches remain key monitoring points because any deterioration in Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb can affect tanker confidence, insurance pricing and delivery schedules.

Energy-market pressure has eased, and Opec+ plans to raise output again in August support a more stable supply picture. Saudi Arabia is set to increase output under the latest Opec+ allocation, which reinforces confidence but does not remove maritime exposure.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Saudi land-border connectivity remains broadly functional. The UAE–Saudi Ghuwaifat/Al Batha route, Bahrain–Saudi King Fahd Causeway, Qatar–Saudi Abu Samra/Salwa crossing, Jordan–Saudi crossings and Kuwait–Saudi routes remain usable for authorised passenger and commercial traffic under standard controls.
- The main supply-chain exposure is not domestic land access, but regional disruption around energy exports, marine insurance, Red Sea/Houthi activity, Hormuz uncertainty and Gulf escalation. Cargo planners should build buffers for fuel pricing, customs delays, driver availability and rerouting from maritime disruption.

## RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	MODERATE
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

## MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Monitor Red Sea routes, Bab el-Mandeb, Ras Tanura, Jubail and Gulf tanker confidence. Confirm war-risk cover, review staff-accountability procedures and keep resilience plans for water, fuel, power and essential supplies.



# United Arab Emirates

## SECURITY SITUATION

The UAE remains operationally open, but the country is still managing a mixed recovery environment. Commercial activity is resilient, but the main external risks remain Hormuz disruption, Red Sea cargo exposure, Gulf airspace sensitivity, GNSS interference, maritime insurance pressure and regional escalation. Priority monitoring areas include airports, ports, government sites, diplomatic locations, energy assets, logistics hubs and high-footfall commercial areas.

## AVIATION

UAE airspace remains open, but flight operations are still being actively managed. Current NOTAMs continue to warn of possible GPS/GNSS interference, including spoofing and jamming, while route controls, tactical routing and departure flow-control measures remain relevant for selected movements. This does not mean UAE aviation is closed or unsafe. It means travel and air cargo should not be planned on routine assumptions. Passengers, executive travellers and cargo planners should allow for possible rerouting, departure delays, slot restrictions and last-minute operational changes, especially on routes linking the UAE with Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Iraq, Iran or the wider northern Gulf.

## MARITIME

UAE ports remain operational, including Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port and Fujairah. The new issue is not port access, but confidence across two maritime corridors: Hormuz and the Red Sea. Hormuz remains sensitive because of Iranian leverage claims, tanker caution, mine concerns, vessel incidents and insurance scrutiny. Red Sea-linked cargo is also back in focus after the latest vessel attack off Yemen. Fujairah remains a key advantage for the UAE because it sits outside the inner Gulf and supports bunkering, storage and logistics on the Gulf of Oman side. However, it is still affected by wider Hormuz sentiment, vessel availability and war-risk pricing. Shipping teams should confirm routing, port timing, insurer approval, crew-safety procedures and contingency delivery windows before moving critical cargo.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- UAE land connectivity remains open through the Saudi border at Ghuwaifat/Al Batha and the Oman crossings, including Hatta/Al Wajajah and Khatmat Malaha. These routes should remain primary resilience channels for overland passenger movement, road freight and contingency evacuation.
- The UAE's key supply-chain exposure is maritime and air-linked rather than domestic movement. Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port and Fujairah remain central to regional cargo flows, but Hormuz instability, Red Sea attacks and insurance caution keep Gulf-linked cargo vulnerable.

## RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	MODERATE
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

## MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm NOTAMs before air movement, verify war-risk cover for Hormuz or Red Sea-linked cargo, keep UAE-Saudi and UAE-Oman land-route options live, and maintain executive movement controls.



## SECURITY SITUATION

Oman remains a key de-confliction and maritime coordination state, but the emphasis has shifted from operational routing to geopolitical leverage. Hormuz is now being framed by Iran and external actors as a strategic pressure point, not only a shipping lane. That increases Oman's diplomatic importance because Muscat sits close to the physical transit issue and remains a useful channel for regional de-confliction.

## AVIATION

Oman airspace remains open and continues to support regional rerouting around higher-risk airspace. Muscat FIR remains important because some operators may use southern or Gulf bypass routes while Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and northern Gulf risk remains elevated.

Flight planning should remain cautious. Operators should monitor NOTAMs, routing links with UAE and Saudi airspace, fuel planning, flow-control measures and any changes linked to Hormuz, Red Sea activity or regional military movement.

## MARITIME

Hormuz remains Oman's main operational and geopolitical exposure. Iran-linked statements continue to frame the strait as a source of strategic leverage, while UK and French readiness to support a multinational maritime security force could reassure shipping but also sharpen Iranian objections.

For Oman, the issue is not only whether vessels can transit. It is whether the southern/Omani-side approach remains predictable, commercially viable and politically uncontested. Iran does not need to close Hormuz to create leverage; selective routing demands, fee language, vessel warnings, naval signalling or enforcement threats would be enough to increase insurance pressure and slow confidence.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Oman-UAE land crossings remain open and should continue to support passenger movement, road freight and contingency access between Muscat, Sohar, Buraimi, Hatta and the wider UAE logistics network.
- Oman's main supply-chain exposure is maritime rather than domestic movement. Ports and land routes remain usable, but Hormuz-linked cargo, tanker scheduling, marine insurance and crew-security planning remain sensitive. Keep UAE land routes available for urgent movement if maritime conditions deteriorate.

## RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	MODERATE
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

## MITIGATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Confirm Omani, IMO and UKMTO routing guidance before Hormuz-linked transit, verify war-risk insurance, monitor VHF instructions, keep AIS/LRIT active where required, and maintain UAE land-route alternatives.



# Bahrain

## SECURITY SITUATION

Bahrain remains one of the most sensitive GCC environments, but the new emphasis is its visible security role rather than only strike exposure. CENTCOM's regional security dialogue in Bahrain and the King's meeting with the CENTCOM commander reinforce Bahrain's position inside the Gulf security architecture. That supports deterrence and coordination, but it also keeps Bahrain exposed if US-Iran tensions deteriorate. Priority monitoring areas include government sites, diplomatic locations, military-linked facilities, airport areas, ports, residential compounds and high-footfall commercial locations.

## AVIATION

Bahrain aviation remains open but sensitive. The main issue is not routine closure, but the risk of short-notice restrictions, air-defence activity, rerouting, delays and NOTAM changes if regional tensions rise again. Executive travel, staff rotations and time-sensitive cargo should not be planned on normal assumptions without confirming current airspace status and flight permissions. Bahrain's small airspace and proximity to wider Gulf military activity mean disruption can develop quickly during alerts.

## MARITIME

Bahrain's ports remain usable, but maritime exposure is tied to the wider Gulf rather than a specific port shutdown. Hormuz disruption, tanker caution, war-risk pricing, vessel incidents and insurer restrictions can affect cargo confidence and delivery windows into Bahrain.

Because Bahrain relies heavily on regional logistics links, maritime disruption can quickly push pressure onto air cargo and the King Fahd Causeway. Port users should confirm vessel schedules, insurer approval, cargo timing, crew-safety procedures and contingency delivery windows before moving critical cargo.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- The King Fahd Causeway remains Bahrain's primary movement and supply-chain link with Saudi Arabia. It should remain the key route for passenger movement, freight support, staff relocation, medical evacuation planning and contingency access to the wider GCC road network.
- Routine movement continues, but movement approvals, staff accountability and shelter-in-place planning should remain tightened. Logistics exposure is indirect but material through Gulf maritime disruption, insurance pricing, airspace sensitivity and possible delays affecting port-linked cargo.

## RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	MODERATE
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	HIGH
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	MODERATE

## MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Verify airspace status, keep Causeway relocation plans live, avoid sensitive sites during alerts, maintain staff-accountability checks, and confirm port, cargo insurance and cross-border transport availability.



## SECURITY SITUATION

Qatar is improving operationally but remains strategically exposed. The key change is that maritime activity has resumed after a week-long pause, which is a positive confirmation signal for local operating conditions. However, Doha's diplomatic role also keeps Qatar close to the US-Iran and Syria tracks. Qatar's prime minister has received Syria's foreign minister in Doha, reinforcing Qatar's broader regional mediation and reconstruction role.

The main exposure is not domestic instability, but regional spillover through LNG, airspace, Hormuz-linked maritime flows and the risk that diplomacy becomes strained by events in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Yemen.

## AVIATION

Qatar airspace remains open and Hamad International Airport continues to support normal commercial operations. The main aviation risk is indirect. If Gulf tensions rise again, Qatar-linked routes could face rerouting, delays, NOTAM changes, airspace restrictions or fuel-planning changes.

Maintain diversion planning, monitor regional airspace updates and allow for possible schedule changes if Kuwait, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq or Hormuz-linked tensions increase.

## MARITIME

Qatar's resumption of maritime activity is the clearest positive update in this report. It reduces immediate local disruption risk and supports the view that selective recovery is under way. However, Qatar's strategic maritime exposure remains high because LNG exports depend on confidence in Hormuz transit. The main risk is not a domestic port shutdown, but tanker caution, Iranian control claims, war-risk pricing, vessel incidents, mine concerns and insurer restrictions affecting ships moving through the strait. Any new warning-shot event, seizure threat, permit-style control or insurance restriction in Hormuz could affect cargo timing, tanker availability and market confidence even if Qatari infrastructure remains secure.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN


- Qatar's Abu Samra/Salwa crossing with Saudi Arabia remains open and should continue to support passenger movement, road freight and regional contingency access.
- Qatar remains operationally stable, but its supply-chain exposure is high because LNG exports, air cargo, food security and port operations depend on confidence in Hormuz and wider Gulf maritime routing. Build cargo-delay buffers, monitor LNG and tanker movement, verify insurer conditions, maintain Qatar-Saudi land-route options, and review air-cargo contingency plans if Gulf airspace warnings increase.

### RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	MODERATE
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	MODERATE
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

### MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Monitor LNG, maritime and aviation conditions, confirm insurer and port guidance, maintain Qatar-Saudi land-route options, and keep executive travel plans flexible.



## SECURITY SITUATION

Kuwait remains one of the most constrained GCC environments. The main concerns are missile and airspace sensitivity, northern Gulf exposure, Kuwait-Iraq border restrictions and proximity to Iraq-linked escalation routes. The new wider context is that Iraq and Jordan are accelerating the Basra-Aqaba oil pipeline project, underlining regional interest in alternative export routes that reduce reliance on Gulf chokepoints. That is strategically relevant, but it does not reduce Kuwait's near-term exposure. Security planning should remain elevated around government sites, diplomatic locations, military-linked facilities, energy infrastructure, ports, airports and high-footfall commercial areas.

## AVIATION

Kuwait aviation remains sensitive. Airspace may be available, but it should not be treated as routine. The main risks are short-notice restrictions, air-defence activity, rerouting, delays and rapid NOTAM changes if regional tensions increase.

Passenger travel, executive movement and air cargo should only proceed after confirming current air permissions, flight status and routing. Kuwait should remain one of the most closely checked aviation environments in the GCC until there is a longer clean period without missile, airspace or alert-related disruption.

## MARITIME

Kuwait's maritime exposure is high because its Gulf access depends on confidence in Hormuz and northern Gulf routing. The main risk is not necessarily port closure, but vessel caution, war-risk pricing, insurer restrictions, tanker availability and possible delays affecting Kuwait-linked cargo.

Opec+ output increases are positive for wider market confidence, and Kuwait's production target is set to rise under the latest allocation. However, this improves energy-market signalling more than Kuwait's physical exposure to northern Gulf disruption.

## MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Kuwait requires strong movement controls. Kuwait-Saudi crossings, including Nuwaisib and Salmi, remain the main usable overland routes for authorised passenger and freight movement. These should be treated as the primary fallback for staff movement, urgent logistics and southbound contingency relocation.
- The Kuwait-Iraq border remains restricted or closed for normal travel unless Kuwaiti and Iraqi authorities confirm otherwise. Do not route staff or time-sensitive cargo through the Iraq border without official confirmation, written movement authority and security review. Movement planning should account for possible delays, temporary restrictions, alert activity and heightened security screening.

### RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	HIGH
Conflict	SEVERE
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	HIGH
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

### MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm air permissions, prioritise Kuwait-Saudi overland routing, avoid Kuwait-Iraq movement unless officially cleared, maintain staff-accountability checks, and keep three-day resilience plans for water, power, fuel and essential supplies.



# Escalation Triggers

## RED ACT NOW

- A second Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb vessel attack occurs after the latest incident off Yemen, indicating the threat is no longer isolated.
- Iran directly challenges or obstructs any UK-France or wider multinational maritime security activity around Hormuz.
- US-IrQatar reintroduces maritime restrictions after its full resumption of maritime activity, suggesting renewed Gulf operating concern.
- Kuwait or Bahrain records renewed missile, drone, interception, airspace or security-alert activity.

## AMBER WATCH

- Iranian or aligned messaging increasingly frames Hormuz as leverage rather than shared transit space.
- UK-France Hormuz security planning moves from political statement to visible naval deployment or operational coordination.
- Opec+ output recovery supports energy confidence, but shipping and insurance risk remain the limiting factors.
- Qatar's maritime reopening holds, but LNG and tanker operators remain cautious on Hormuz-linked movement..

## GREEN IMPROVING

- No further vessel attacks occur off Yemen, Bab el-Mandeb or the southern Red Sea for a sustained period.
- GCC aviation remains open without new airspace closures, major NOTAM surges or GNSS escalation.
- Hormuz transits continue without seizures, warning shots, harassment, groundings, route disputes or insurer withdrawal.

### Additional watch items

- Red Sea attacks shifting from isolated incidents to repeated pressure on commercial vessels.
- Iranian language moving from deterrence to practical control claims over Hormuz routing, access or fees.
- European maritime security planning around Hormuz and whether Oman, the US or regional states support it publicly.
- Qatar maritime flows after reopening, especially LNG-linked tanker scheduling and port confidence.
- Opec+ output recovery and whether increased production is matched by stable export routing.
- Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen creating pressure that spills back into the US-Iran track.
- Kuwait and Bahrain security posture, including airspace alerts, military coordination and visible US-linked activity.corridors.

### Positive confirmation signals

- Qatar remains fully open for maritime activity through the week.
- No repeat Red Sea attack follows the latest UKMTO-reported incident.
- Hormuz remains commercially usable without new Iranian enforcement activity.
- UK-France Hormuz discussions remain coordinated and do not provoke Iranian operational response.
- Energy markets absorb Opec+ output increases without renewed supply anxiety.
- GCC air routes remain open and usable despite continued route-management measures.
- Kuwait and Bahrain record no renewed strike, interception or major alert activity.
- Oman and Qatar continue functioning as diplomatic and de-confliction channels.

# Look Ahead

The next phase is no longer defined by whether the GCC is reopening. It is defined by whether selective recovery can hold while maritime pressure spreads across two chokepoints. Qatar's resumption of maritime activity, Opec+ output recovery and continued GCC aviation activity are positive signals. However, the latest vessel attack off Yemen shows that Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb risk has re-entered the operating picture just as Hormuz remains politically contested.

This changes the geopolitical frame. The region is not moving from crisis to normality; it is moving from direct escalation risk into a more complicated contest over maritime leverage. Hormuz remains the central symbol because Iran and aligned voices continue to treat the strait as strategic pressure. At the same time, UK-France readiness to support a multinational Hormuz security effort introduces a new external-force dynamic. That could reassure shipping, but it could also create another point of friction with Tehran.

For the GCC, the recovery is uneven. Qatar has the clearest positive update because maritime activity has resumed, but LNG and Hormuz exposure still make it vulnerable to any renewed tanker caution. Oman's value rises because Hormuz security and de-confliction increasingly depend on Muscat's geography and diplomatic channels. Saudi Arabia benefits from stronger energy confidence, but Red Sea risk is now more relevant to western routes and cargo sentiment. The UAE remains commercially resilient, but aviation management, GNSS interference and maritime-routing risk remain active. Kuwait and Bahrain remain the most sensitive states because of geography, airspace exposure and security posture.

**Next 72–96 hours:** Watch whether the Red Sea attack remains isolated, whether Qatar's maritime reopening holds, and whether Iran reacts to UK-France Hormuz security language. The most important indicators are not broad diplomatic statements, but practical signs: vessel warnings, port restrictions, insurer changes, airspace alerts, GNSS disruption, or new militia-linked pressure from Yemen, Iraq, Syria or Lebanon.

**Next 7–14 days:** The key question is whether maritime recovery becomes credible or stays conditional. If Qatar remains open, Hormuz transits remain clean and no further Red Sea attack occurs, confidence should improve gradually. If attacks repeat off Yemen, or Iran raises pressure through routing demands, control claims, naval signalling or fee language, operators will treat recovery as fragile even if ports and airspace remain technically open.

**Next month:** The wider geopolitical risk is that the Gulf becomes stable on paper but exposed in practice. US-Iran diplomacy may continue, but Hormuz, the Red Sea, Iraq-linked pressure, Syria diplomacy, Lebanon tensions and Yemen maritime activity can all disrupt the track. A multinational Hormuz security effort would be one of the most important developments to watch because it could either stabilise shipping confidence or trigger new Iranian resistance.

**Planning baseline:** The most likely scenario is selective recovery under managed tension. This is not a return to normal conditions. GCC states will continue protecting commercial continuity while quietly preparing for renewed maritime, aviation or militia-linked disruption. Operators should keep posture elevated until three indicators align at the same time: Qatar remains open, Hormuz stays clean, and Red Sea attacks do not repeat.

Saudi Arabia — Energy confidence improving, but Red Sea/Houthi pressure is back in sharper focus — **MODERATE**

Kuwait — Northern Gulf and Iraq-linked exposure remain the hardest constraint — **SEVERE**

UAE — Resilient, but aviation management and two-corridor maritime risk remain active — **MODERATE**

Oman — Diplomatic and maritime value rising as Hormuz becomes more internationally contested — **HIGH**

Bahrain — Security posture and US-linked role keep exposure elevated despite stable domestic operations — **HIGH**

Qatar — Maritime reopening is positive, but LNG and Hormuz exposure keep strategic risk high — **HIGH**

ABOUT & CONTACT

# Global Security Awareness

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Global Security Awareness delivers decision-ready security intelligence to corporate security teams, travel risk managers and executive leadership operating across the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider MENA region.

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## METHODOLOGY

Risk ratings (LOW to SEVERE) are professional judgements based on the information available at the time of writing and are not guarantees of outcome. Strike, infrastructure and operational risk are scored independently for each country and tracked week-on-week.

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