

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL REGION

GCC Weekly Intelligence

13 July 2026

Actionable Intelligence – Regional Protection



Executive Summary

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

The GCC remains in active containment as Kuwait infrastructure, Qatar sailing activity, Oman's Musandam area and Hormuz shipping are all drawn into the US-Iran escalation cycle.

- The GCC remains in active containment as Kuwait infrastructure, Qatar sailing activity, Oman's Musandam area and Hormuz shipping are all drawn into the US-Iran escalation cycle. Risk is no longer limited to maritime transit or airspace alerts. Kuwait has reported attacks affecting border posts and an offshore oil drilling platform, with one injury reported. Qatar has temporarily suspended sailing activity after renewed Iranian attacks and air-defence interceptions. Oman has summoned the Iranian ambassador over drone strikes in Musandam and Al Wusta. Bahrain has again sounded alarm sirens, while the UAE has confirmed missile threats outside its borders
- and said the domestic situation remains stable.
- Hormuz remains the centre of gravity. Iran continues to claim control or closure of the Strait, while US/CENTCOM messaging states that Hormuz remains open to vessels and is not controlled by Iran. This creates a contested-access environment: shipping is still moving, but transit now carries military, political, insurance and crew-security risk.

Kuwait and Bahrain remain the most exposed GCC states. Qatar and Oman have moved higher in the immediate risk picture because of debris, sailing restrictions and Musandam-related drone activity. The UAE remains operationally stable but exposed through air-defence readiness, aviation management, GNSS risk and Hormuz-linked shipping. Saudi Arabia remains exposed through energy confidence, tanker security and Red Sea/Hormuz-linked routing.

Saudi Arabia — Watch — **HIGH**

Kuwait — Deteriorating — **SEVERE**

UAE — Watch — **HIGH**

Oman — Deteriorating — **HIGH**

Bahrain — Deteriorating — **SEVERE**

Qatar — Deteriorating — **HIGH**

PLANNING ASSUMPTION

Plan for active containment, not de-escalation. Movement remains possible across much of the GCC, but the operating environment is unstable. Posture should remain elevated until Kuwait records no further missile, drone or infrastructure incidents; Qatar resumes normal maritime activity; Oman records no further Musandam or Al Wusta targeting; Hormuz transits remain open without new vessel attacks; and US-Iran talks produce a practical maritime de-confliction mechanism.

[Assessed — moderate confidence]

Regional Risk Snapshot

COUNTRY	STRIKE	INFRA	OPS	TREND	ONE-LINE STATUS
Bahrain	SEVERE	HIGH	HIGH	▲ WORSENING	Sirens, air-defence sensitivity and US-linked security posture keep Bahrain inside the severe-risk envelope.
Kuwait	SEVERE	HIGH	HIGH	▲ WORSENING	Border-post attacks, offshore platform targeting, FIR restrictions and northern Gulf exposure keep Kuwait at severe risk.
Qatar	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	▲ WORSENING	Sailing suspension, interception activity, debris injuries, LNG exposure and Hormuz risk keep Qatar highly exposed.
UAE / Dubai	HIGH	MODERATE	MOD-HIGH	▲ WORSENING	Operationally stable, but air-defence readiness, GNSS, flow-control and Hormuz exposure remain active.
Saudi Arabia	HIGH	MODERATE	MODERATE	▲ WORSENING	Energy-security, tanker and Red Sea/Hormuz exposure keep Saudi posture elevated.
Oman	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	▲ WORSENING	Musandam and Al Wusta drone targeting, plus vessel incidents near Oman, increase strategic exposure.

RISK SCALE LOW MODERATE HIGH SEVERE CRITICAL



Saudi Arabia

SECURITY SITUATION

Saudi Arabia remains domestically steady, but its external risk posture remains elevated. The main concern is not internal instability; it is Saudi exposure to two maritime pressure points: Hormuz and the Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb corridor. The GFS Galaxy incident, vessel-risk reporting east of Oman, Iranian claims around Hormuz control and continued Yemen-linked maritime activity all affect Saudi energy confidence, port planning and regional security posture. Saudi Arabia is also part of the diplomatic containment picture. Saudi-Omani coordination on maritime security and strategic partnership gives Riyadh a role in shaping Gulf de-confliction without placing it at the centre of direct US-Iran negotiations. Priority monitoring areas include energy infrastructure, ports, diplomatic sites, government facilities, Red Sea-linked logistics and high-footfall commercial areas.

AVIATION

Saudi airspace remains open and usable for international and domestic operations. Jeddah and Riyadh FIR routes continue to support regional aviation resilience, but operators should review exposure to renewed US-Iran escalation, missile activity, Red Sea/Houthi risk and northern Gulf airspace sensitivity. The main aviation exposure remains indirect: rerouting pressure, fuel-cost volatility, short-notice NOTAM activity and diversion planning if Gulf, Red Sea or Iraq-linked airspace sensitivity increases. Operators should apply elevated review for Eastern Province, Riyadh, Jeddah, Red Sea and Gulf-facing routes.

MARITIME

Saudi maritime exposure remains elevated because Hormuz and the Red Sea are both active risk corridors. The latest Hormuz escalation shows that vessels using routes near Oman may face attack, warning, diversion or enforcement risk. Red Sea and Yemen-linked incidents continue to affect cargo confidence, crew security and insurer sentiment. Ras Tanura, Jubail, Jeddah Islamic Port, Red Sea approaches and Hormuz-linked tanker routes should remain key monitoring points. Vessel routing, war-risk cover, crew safety, insurer approval and tanker scheduling should be checked before critical movement. Any further incident involving Saudi-linked or energy-linked vessels would quickly affect market confidence, insurance pricing and wider GCC risk perception.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Saudi land-border connectivity remains broadly functional. The UAE–Saudi Ghuwair/Al Batha route, Bahrain–Saudi King Fahd Causeway, Qatar–Saudi Abu Samra/Salwa crossing, Jordan–Saudi crossings and Kuwait–Saudi routes remain usable for authorised passenger and commercial traffic under standard controls.
- The main supply-chain exposure is maritime and energy-linked rather than domestic land movement. Cargo planners should build buffers for fuel pricing, customs delays, driver availability, insurance review and maritime rerouting. Maintain alternate routing through UAE, Bahrain and Qatar where relevant, and avoid assuming Gulf logistics have normalised.

RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	HIGH
Conflict	HIGH
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm war-risk cover, monitor Hormuz and Red Sea routes, review staff-accountability procedures, and keep resilience plans for water, fuel, power and essential supplies.



United Arab Emirates

SECURITY SITUATION

The UAE remains operationally stable, but the surrounding risk environment remains elevated. UAE authorities have confirmed missile threats outside the country’s borders and stated that the situation remains stable, with national systems maintaining a high level of readiness. The main UAE exposure remains external and operational: air-defence readiness, aviation route management, GNSS risk, Hormuz-linked shipping, executive travel and cargo timing. The UAE should still be treated as resilient, but not normalised. Any further Iranian targeting of GCC states, Hormuz-linked vessel attacks or regional air-defence activity could affect aviation, public messaging and logistics planning at short notice.

AVIATION

UAE airspace remains open, but flight operations should be treated as actively managed. Current UAE NOTAMs continue to show flow-control measures for selected departures from Emirates FIR, airport works, temporary restrictions and unmanned-aircraft activity areas. This reinforces that aviation is functioning but not fully routine. Passenger travel, executive movement and air cargo should not be planned on normal assumptions. Allow for possible rerouting, departure delays, slot restrictions and last-minute operational changes, especially on routes linked to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Iraq, Iran or the wider northern Gulf.

MARITIME

UAE ports remain operational, including Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port and Fujairah. However, Hormuz risk remains elevated after the GFS Galaxy incident and wider vessel-security concerns east of Oman. Fujairah remains a key UAE advantage because it sits outside the inner Gulf and supports bunkering, storage and logistics on the Gulf of Oman side, but it remains exposed to Hormuz sentiment, insurer caution, vessel availability, war-risk pricing and crew-security concerns. Shipping teams should confirm routing, port timing, insurer approval, crew-safety procedures and contingency delivery windows before moving critical cargo. Hormuz-linked cargo should not be treated as routine even if ports remain open.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- UAE land connectivity remains open through the Saudi border at Ghuwaifat/Al Batha and the Oman crossings, including Hatta/Al Wajajah and Khatmat Malaha. These routes should remain primary resilience channels for overland passenger movement, road freight and contingency evacuation from the western and eastern UAE.
- The UAE’s key supply-chain exposure is maritime and air-linked rather than domestic movement. Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port and Fujairah remain central to regional cargo flows, but Hormuz escalation, Red Sea uncertainty, insurance caution and aviation route management keep Gulf-linked cargo vulnerable.

RISK RATINGS

Political	MODERATE
Business	HIGH
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm NOTAMs before air movement, verify war-risk cover, keep UAE–Saudi and UAE–Oman land-route options live, and maintain executive movement controls.



SECURITY SITUATION

Oman’s exposure has increased further after Muscat summoned Iran’s ambassador over drone strikes in Musandam and Al Wusta. This places Oman more directly inside the escalation cycle, alongside the GFS Galaxy incident east of Oman and the continuing dispute over Hormuz routing. Oman remains a key de-confliction and maritime coordination state, but its geography now creates direct exposure. Musandam is especially sensitive because of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz and the southern transit route. Any further targeting in Musandam, Duqm, Al Wusta or waters east of Oman would raise concern that Oman is being pressured because of its maritime position and diplomatic role. Oman should remain at high risk until Hormuz incidents stop, Musandam and Al Wusta see no further targeting, and US-Iran talks produce a workable transit mechanism.

AVIATION

Oman airspace remains open and continues to support regional rerouting around higher-risk airspace. Muscat FIR remains important because some operators may use southern or Gulf bypass routes while Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and northern Gulf risk remains elevated.

Flight planning should remain cautious. Operators should monitor NOTAMs, routing links with UAE and Saudi airspace, fuel planning, flow-control measures and any changes linked to Hormuz, Red Sea activity, Musandam security developments or regional military movement.

MARITIME

Hormuz remains Oman’s main operational and geopolitical exposure. The GFS Galaxy incident east of Oman, previous tanker-risk reporting near Limah and Iranian statements about route compliance show that the southern/Omani-side approach is no longer a low-risk assumption. It may still reduce exposure compared with Iranian-side routing, but it does not remove the risk of attack, warning, diversion, miscalculation or insurer caution.

Iran is now using the June MoU as a pressure point, arguing that the US must comply with agreed arrangements while also framing unauthorised routing as a source of insecurity. This keeps Oman in a difficult position. Muscat may be essential to restoring a maritime mechanism, but any breakdown in US-Iran talks or new enforcement action in the strait will directly affect Oman-linked waters.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Oman–UAE land crossings remain open and should continue to support passenger movement, road freight and contingency access between Muscat, Sohar, Buraimi, Hatta and the wider UAE logistics network.
- Oman’s main supply-chain exposure is maritime rather than domestic movement. Ports and land routes remain usable, but Hormuz-linked cargo, tanker scheduling, marine insurance and crew-security planning remain sensitive. Keep UAE land routes available for urgent movement if maritime conditions deteriorate.

RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	MODERATE
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm Omani, IMO and UKMTO routing guidance, verify war-risk insurance, monitor VHF instructions, keep AIS/LRIT active where required, and maintain UAE land-route alternatives.



Bahrain

SECURITY SITUATION

Bahrain remains one of the most sensitive GCC environments. Siren activity, high military-activity warnings, potential GPS interference and Bahrain’s US-linked security profile keep the country highly exposed during any renewed US-Iran escalation. The risk is not only direct attack; it is the speed with which regional military activity can affect public alerts, aviation, staff movement and executive travel.

Priority monitoring areas include government sites, diplomatic locations, military-linked facilities, airport areas, ports, residential compounds and high-footfall commercial locations. Security teams should treat Bahrain as an elevated operational environment, even if routine movement continues.

AVIATION

Bahrain aviation remains open but highly sensitive. Bahrain NOTAM material flags an area of high concentration of military activity and civilian crossing traffic, with pilots required to maintain listening watch and follow ATC instructions. It also notes potential GPS signal interference within Bahrain FIR and at Bahrain International.

The main risk is short-notice restriction, air-defence activity, rerouting, delays and NOTAM changes if missile, drone or regional military threats continue. Executive travel, staff rotations and time-sensitive cargo should not be planned on normal assumptions without confirming current airspace status and flight permissions.

MARITIME

Bahrain’s ports remain usable, but maritime exposure is tied to the wider Gulf rather than a specific port shutdown. Hormuz disruption, tanker caution, war-risk pricing, vessel incidents and insurer restrictions can all affect cargo confidence and delivery windows into Bahrain.

Because Bahrain relies heavily on regional logistics links, maritime disruption can quickly push pressure onto air cargo and the King Fahd Causeway. Port users should confirm vessel schedules, insurer approval, cargo timing, crew-safety procedures and contingency delivery windows before moving critical cargo.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- The King Fahd Causeway remains Bahrain’s primary movement and supply-chain link with Saudi Arabia. It should remain the key route for passenger movement, freight support, staff relocation, medical evacuation planning and contingency access to the wider GCC road network.
- Routine movement continues, but movement approvals, staff accountability and shelter-in-place planning should remain tightened. During alert periods, avoid non-essential movement near sensitive sites, pre-identify safe assembly points and maintain rapid cross-border relocation options into Saudi Arabia.

RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	HIGH
Conflict	HIGH
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	LOW
Crime	LOW
Legal	MODERATE

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Verify airspace status, keep Causeway relocation plans live, avoid sensitive sites during alerts, maintain staff-accountability checks, and confirm cross-border transport availability.



SECURITY SITUATION

Qatar remains diplomatically important but directly exposed. Qatar temporarily suspended sailing activities after renewed attacks and air-defence activity, while earlier debris injuries confirm that the risk is now public-safety, maritime and LNG-linked, not only diplomatic. Doha remains a key mediation channel, and any resumed US-Iran talks will likely require Qatari involvement. However, Qatar is operating under greater pressure: it is expected to support de-escalation while managing air-defence alerts, debris risk, sailing restrictions, LNG exposure and Hormuz-linked tanker confidence. Qatar should remain at high risk until sailing activity fully resumes, debris and air-defence incidents stop, and Hormuz transit stabilises.

AVIATION

Qatar airspace remains open and Hamad International Airport continues to support normal commercial operations. The main aviation risk is indirect but rising. If Gulf tensions increase further, Qatar-linked routes could face rerouting, delays, NOTAM changes, airspace restrictions or fuel-planning changes. Maintain diversion planning, monitor regional airspace updates and allow for schedule changes if Kuwait, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq or Hormuz-linked tensions increase. During interception activity, staff should avoid exposed areas, windows and any debris.

MARITIME

Qatar's maritime risk remains high because LNG exports depend on Hormuz confidence. The GFS Galaxy incident and wider Hormuz enforcement dispute increase the risk that tanker movement becomes politicised, delayed or subject to insurer caution. The main risk is not domestic port closure, but tanker caution, Iranian control claims, war-risk pricing, vessel incidents, mine concerns and insurer restrictions affecting ships moving through the strait. Any new warning-shot event, seizure threat, permit-style control, UAV strike or insurance restriction in Hormuz could affect cargo timing, tanker availability and market confidence even if Qatari infrastructure remains secure.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN


- Qatar's Abu Samra/Salwa crossing with Saudi Arabia remains open and should continue to support passenger movement, road freight and regional contingency access. This route remains important for fallback access to the wider GCC road network.
- Qatar remains operationally stable onshore, but its supply-chain exposure is high because LNG exports, air cargo, food security and port operations depend on confidence in Hormuz and wider Gulf maritime routing. Build cargo-delay buffers, monitor LNG and tanker movement, verify insurer conditions, maintain Qatar-Saudi land-route options and review air-cargo contingency plans if Gulf airspace warnings increase.

RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	HIGH
Conflict	MODERATE
Civil Unrest	MODERATE
Environmental	MODERATE
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Monitor LNG, maritime and aviation conditions, confirm insurer and port guidance, maintain Qatar-Saudi land-route options, and keep executive travel plans flexible.



SECURITY SITUATION

Kuwait remains one of the most exposed GCC environments after reported attacks affecting three border posts and an offshore oil drilling platform. The platform incident reportedly caused one injury, shifting Kuwait's risk from airspace and alert sensitivity into direct infrastructure exposure. The main concerns are missile and drone activity, air-defence response, debris risk, northern Gulf exposure, energy infrastructure vulnerability, Kuwait-Iraq border restrictions, GPS interference and proximity to Iraq-linked escalation routes. Security planning should remain elevated around government sites, diplomatic locations, military-linked facilities, energy infrastructure, ports, airports, offshore assets, residential compounds and high-footfall commercial areas. Kuwait should remain in the severe-risk category until there is a sustained clean period without missile, drone, GPS, airspace, power or infrastructure disruption.

AVIATION

Kuwait aviation should be treated as highly sensitive. Kuwait FIR restrictions and GPS interference concerns remain relevant, and any missile or drone activity can rapidly trigger airspace disruption, rerouting, delays or temporary operating restrictions. Passenger travel, executive movement and air cargo should only proceed after confirming current air permissions, flight status and routing.

Kuwait should remain one of the most closely checked aviation environments in the GCC until there is a sustained clean period without missile, drone, GPS, airspace or alert-related disruption.

MARITIME

Kuwait's maritime exposure remains high because its Gulf access depends on confidence in Hormuz and northern Gulf routing. The main risk is not port closure, but vessel caution, war-risk pricing, insurer restrictions, tanker availability and possible delays affecting Kuwait-linked cargo.

Even if ports remain usable, shipping confidence can be affected quickly by missile activity, US-Iran tensions, Iranian control claims over Hormuz, vessel incidents or insurance tightening. Shipping teams should confirm port status, vessel routing, war-risk cover, crew-safety procedures and contingency delivery windows before moving critical cargo.

MOVEMENT - SUPPLY CHAIN

- Kuwait requires strong movement controls. Kuwait-Saudi crossings, including Nuwaisib and Salmi, remain the main usable overland routes for authorised passenger and freight movement. These should be treated as the primary fallback for staff movement, urgent logistics and southbound contingency relocation.
- The Kuwait-Iraq border remains restricted or closed for normal travel unless Kuwaiti and Iraqi authorities confirm otherwise. Do not route staff or time-sensitive cargo through the Iraq border without official confirmation, written movement authority and security review. Movement planning should account for possible delays, temporary restrictions, alert activity and heightened security screening.

RISK RATINGS

Political	HIGH
Business	HIGH
Economic	HIGH
Conflict	SEVERE
Civil Unrest	LOW
Environmental	HIGH
Crime	LOW
Legal	LOW

MITIGATIONS & RECOMENDATIONS

Confirm air permissions, prioritise Kuwait-Saudi overland routing, avoid Kuwait-Iraq movement unless officially cleared, maintain staff-accountability checks, and keep three-day resilience plans for water, power, fuel and essential supplies.



Escalation Triggers

RED ACT NOW

- Further missile or drone activity targets Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman or another GCC state.
- A Hormuz-linked vessel is struck, seized, boarded, diverted, warned away or delayed under Iranian routing or control claims.
- US strikes on Iran expand or trigger further Iranian retaliation against Gulf territory, shipping or energy infrastructure.
- Kuwait records additional attacks on border posts, offshore platforms, energy infrastructure, utilities or military-linked sites.

AMBER WATCH

- Iran continues to accuse the US of violating the June MoU while also pressing for control over Hormuz routing.
- Kuwait remains open but reports shrapnel disposal, infrastructure alerts or additional security restrictions. Oman continues diplomatic protest activity linked to Musandam or Al Wusta targeting.
- Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen incidents distract from or weaken the US-Iran track.
- US activity against IRGC boats, coastal sites or maritime infrastructure expands. Iran continues to claim control or closure of the Strait while the US insists Hormuz remains open and internationally navigable.

GREEN IMPROVING

- US-Iran talks resume with a practical mechanism for Hormuz transit and maritime de-confliction. GCC air routes remain open without major new disruption.
- No new UKMTO warnings are issued for Yemen, Oman or Hormuz for a sustained period. Oil, LNG and tanker scheduling stabilise without major insurance withdrawal.
- Kuwait records a clean period without further missile, drone, shrapnel, infrastructure or platform incidents. Oman records no further Musandam, Al Wusta, Duqm or Hormuz-linked incidents.

Additional watch items

- Iranian MoU language and whether Tehran frames compliance as a condition for safe Hormuz transit.
- US messaging on talks, sanctions and further military options.
- Oman's security posture after Musandam drone targeting.
- Qatar debris injuries, public-safety messaging and air-defence activity.
- Bahrain sirens, military-activity warnings and US-linked security posture.
- Kuwait aviation restrictions, GPS interference and FIR access conditions.
- UKMTO warning tempo across Yemen, Oman and Hormuz.
- Israel-Lebanon escalation that could weaken the wider de-confliction track.
- Kuwait offshore oil platform status, border-post security and shrapnel-disposal activity.

Positive confirmation signals

- No further vessel attacks in Hormuz, Oman or Yemen waters for seven days.
- No further Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar or Oman alert activity.
- US-Iran talks restart and remain active beyond initial statements.
- Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia remain engaged in de-escalation diplomacy.
- GCC air routes remain open without major new disruption.
- War-risk cover remains available for Hormuz-linked cargo.
- Energy exports and LNG flows continue without major delay.
- GCC land borders remain open and functioning under standard controls.
- Kuwait reports no further infrastructure, border-post, platform or missile/drone incidents.

Look Ahead

The regional outlook remains highly unstable. The latest shift is that active containment now includes direct infrastructure exposure, not only maritime and airspace risk. Kuwait's reported border-post and offshore platform incidents, Qatar's sailing suspension, Oman's Musandam and Al Wusta drone-strike issue, Bahrain sirens and the GFS Galaxy incident all show how quickly a Hormuz-centred crisis can spread into national security, public safety and energy infrastructure.

Hormuz remains the decisive issue. Iran continues to claim control, closure or management authority over the Strait, while US/CENTCOM messaging states that Hormuz remains open and is not controlled by Iran. This means the crisis is now a contest over enforcement as much as access. The route may remain physically open, but it is politically contested and commercially exposed.

For operators, the most important point is that continuity does not equal normalisation. Shipping is moving, airports remain open and land borders continue to function, but each system is operating under higher risk. Maritime transit, aviation routing, insurer approval, executive movement and staff-accountability planning should all remain on elevated posture.

Next 72–96 hours: Watch Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Hormuz. The immediate indicators are further Kuwaiti infrastructure or border attacks, Qatar sailing restrictions, new Omani diplomatic/security statements, Bahrain siren activity, UAE air-defence messaging, and any US or Iranian military action near the Strait. A further vessel incident, platform strike or GCC debris event would confirm continued escalation.

Next 7–14 days: The key question is whether US-Iran diplomacy can produce a practical maritime mechanism or whether each side continues using the Strait as a pressure tool. If Hormuz stays open without new vessel attacks, Qatar resumes sailing activity and Kuwait records no further infrastructure incidents, risk may stabilise at a high level. If Iran attempts to enforce control, or if the US expands strikes around Hormuz, commercial confidence will weaken quickly.

Next month: The most likely scenario is prolonged active containment. Gulf states will keep trying to preserve commercial continuity while raising maritime, aviation and public-safety readiness. Oman and Qatar remain important de-escalation channels, but both are now directly exposed. Saudi Arabia and the UAE will focus on energy, ports and logistics resilience, while Kuwait and Bahrain remain the most sensitive states for direct spillover.

Planning baseline: Treat the region as open but unstable. Operational movement can continue, but posture should remain elevated until four indicators align: no further GCC missile, drone or debris incidents; no further Hormuz vessel attacks; Qatar maritime activity returns to normal; and US-Iran talks produce a workable transit mechanism.

Saudi Arabia — Energy and Red Sea/Hormuz exposure keep posture elevated — **HIGH**

Kuwait — FIR restrictions, GPS interference and northern Gulf exposure keep Kuwait severe — **SEVERE**

UAE — Operationally resilient but exposed to Hormuz, aviation flow controls and GNSS disruption — **HIGH**

Oman — Musandam targeting and Hormuz proximity increase strategic exposure — **HIGH**

Bahrain — Sirens, military-activity warnings and US-linked profile keep exposure severe — **HIGH**

Qatar — Debris injuries, LNG exposure and mediation pressure keep strategic risk high — **HIGH**

ABOUT & CONTACT

Global Security Awareness

Global Security Awareness delivers decision-ready security intelligence to corporate security teams, travel risk managers and executive leadership operating across the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider MENA region.

METHODOLOGY

Risk ratings (LOW to SEVERE) are professional judgements based on the information available at the time of writing and are not guarantees of outcome. Strike, infrastructure and operational risk are scored independently for each country and tracked week-on-week.

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